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I INTRODUCT[ON
The Valente' and Beauregard2 cases have given the Supreme
Court of Canada an opportunity to interpret the principle of judicial
independence.3 While the Supreme Court's doctrine of judicial
independence, to the extent it has developed, is in many ways sound,
there are several important aspects of the principle which the court
has not yet fully considered. As one of the cornerstones of liberal-
democratic theory,4 it is critical that judicial independence be
interpreted as incisively as possible by the Supreme Court. Even
minor weaknesses in the Court's approach could have serious long-
run consequences for maintaining the legitimacy of the courts as key
institutions in Canada's liberal democratic political system. If, for
example, the principle is interpreted too narrowly, then the stage is
set for the erosion of judicial independence, and thus also of the
rule of law. On the other hand, if judicial independence is
interpreted too broadly, then the judiciary will have the opportunity
IValente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.rIL 673 [hereinafter Valente].
2The Queen v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 [hereinafter Beauregard].
3These decisions should also be regarded as contributions to the body of literature
concerning the principle of judicial independence in the Anglo-Canadian tradition. Some of
the most commonly cited works in this body of literature are: W.R. Lederman, 'The
Independence of the Judiciary' (1956) 34 Can. B. Rev. 769 and 1139; W.R. Lederman, 'he
Independence of the Judiciary' in A.M. Linden, ed., he Canadian Judiciary (Toronto:
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1976); S. Shetreet, Judges on Trial: A Study of
the Appointment and Accountabilit of the English Judiciary (Amsterdam: North Holland
Publishing Co., 1976); S. Shetreet & J. Deschenes, eds, Judicial Independence: The
Contemporary Debate (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985); and
R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 5th ed., rev'd by Norman Ward (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1970) at 396-410.
4John Locke described the importance of an impartial judiciary in The Second Trcatisc
of Government (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952 [c. 1690]) at 49-84. The central thrust of
Locke and liberal theorists since then is that law consists of norms created directly or
indirectly with the consent of all citizens. The question of whether someone has broken the
law must be inquired into and answered as objectively as possible, since the law is for the
benefit of everyone, not a particular or privileged group. Such an objective or impartial
consideration requires independent judges, that is, judges who are not controlled by any of the
litigants.
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to expand its power and its privileges for reasons not related to
liberal democratic theory. Errors in either direction may undermine
the credibility of the courts as fair and impartial arbiters of legal
disputes.
The essay begins with summaries of the Valente and
Beauregard decisions, and then proceeds to a critique of the doctrine
of judicial independence as developed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in these two cases. The critique suggests that three aspects
of judicial independence have not received careful enough attention
from the Court. These are:
1. the relation between judicial independence and judicial'
impartiality;
2. the relation between judicial independence and the
mechanisms devised to attempt to protect it; and
3. the relation between judicial independence and the
institutional role of the courts.
II. THE VALENTE CASE
The issue in the Valente case was whether the guarantees of
the independence of provincially-appointed judges were sufficient for
the judges to qualify as independent tribunals pursuant to section
11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 11(d)
stipulates that all persons charged with offences have a right to be
tried by "independent and impartial" tribunals. Walter Valente had
been charged with dangerous driving in 1981. In an attempt to
keep his client out of jail, Noel Bates, Valente's lawyer, argued
before a Provincial Court Judge late in 1982 that the judge did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case, because he did not meet the
standard of independence set by section 11(d).5 According to Bates,
the standard for judicial independence in Canada is, at the least, the
standard of independence enjoyed by provincial superior court
judges. Their security of tenure and financial security are protected
5P.T. Heron, "Judicial independcnce aside, has Walter Valente been forgotten?" (1987)
7 Can. Law. 12.
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by sections 99 and 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867.6 Further,
Bates noted that superior court judges have their own benefit plans,
presumably to protect judicial independence, while Provincial Court
judges come under provincial public service benefit plans, and are
subject-to the same rules of eligibility as ordinary public servants.
In addition to these points, Bates raised two issues which
have implications for all levels of courts in Canada. First, he
pointed out that the executive branch has the power to grant special
privileges to certain judges, such as leave of absence to head a
commission of enquiry, or a promotion to a more highly paid
position, such as Chief Judge or Justice. Presumably, a judge might
favour the executive in order to obtain such privileges. Second,
judges must rely on the executive for court administration services,
and the executive could take advantage of this situation to influence
judicial decisions.
The Provincial Court judge who heard these arguments
decided that they had sufficient merit for the case to be considered
by a superior court judge. Accordingly, he declined jurisdiction until
the case could be heard by the Ontario Court of Appeal. Two
other judges and a justice of the peace then decided to decline
jurisdiction whenever counsel for an accused raised the judicial
independence argument, and this series of events became known as
the 'judges' revolt."7
The Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in this case was that
in spite of the absence of constitutional guarantees, and sometimes
even of statutory guarantees of judicial independence, adherence to
the tradition of judicial independence by the executive branch of
6Section 99 stipulates that superior court judges "shall hold office during good behaviour"
until retirement, and that they are removable only through the procedure of joint address of
the Senate and House of Commons. Section 100 states that the salaries and pensions of
superior, district, and county court judges shall be "fixed and provided" by Parliament. The
word "fixed" may imply that the salaries may not be lowered except as part of an overall salary
reduction plan during an economic recession. See Lederman in the Can. B. Rev., mipra,
note 3.
7See M. Strauss, "Spreading Debate Forseen Over Judges Independence" The IToronto]
Globe and Mail (29 December 1982) Al, A2; 0. French, "Shedding Light on Judges" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (6 January 1983) A7; and articles in (1983) 7 Can. Law. for an
account of these events. The decision of the Provincial Court in the Valente case is reported
in (1983), 3 C.R.R. 1.
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government in Ontario meant that Provincial Court judges could be
considered independent for the purposes of the Charter.8 The court
suggested a "reasonable person" test to determine whether Provincial
Court judges are independent:
[The test is] whether a reasonable person, who was informed of the relevant
statutory provisions, their historical background, and the traditions surrounding
them, after viewing the matter realistically and practically would conclude that a
provincial court judge ... was a tribunal which could make an independent and
impartial adjudication.9
The Ontario Court of Appeal's decision was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada. The unanimous decision of the six-
member panel, which upheld the Appeal Court's decision, was
written by Mr. Justice Le Dain. He adopted much of Chief Justice
Howland's reasoning, including the "reasonable person" test.
However, an attempt was made to analyse the concept of judicial
independence more precisely. For example, Mr. Justice Le Dain
posited that independence and impartiality are distinguishable
concepts. Impartiality connotes a state of mind of absence of bias,
whereas independence refers to relationships between judges and
others, particularly others in the executive branch of government.
These relationships should be so structured as to ensure that judges
have the capacity to act independently in their decision making.10
In order to ensure that judges have this capacity to act
independently, Mr. Justice Le Dain identified three "essential
conditions" for judicial independence. He claimed that these
conditions are "at the heart" of the various approaches to protecting
judicial independence in the several Canadian jurisdictions.1" One
set of conditions, for example the conditions for the independence
of superior court judges, cannot be taken as the absolute standard.
Rather, the standard must come from what is central to all the
8Regina v. Valente (no. 2) (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 187.
9Ibid. at 210.
"OValente, supra, note 1 at 685.
11 1bid. at 694.
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diverse sets of conditions. Mr. Justice Le Dain observed that the
identification of the essential conditions for judicial independence is
a difficult task, since "the concept of judicial independence has been
an evolving one."12
The essential conditions referred to by Mr. Justice Le Dain
are security of tenure, financial security, and the institutional
independence of judicial tribunals regarding matters directly affecting
adjudication. In order to possess security of tenure, a judge must
have an appointment which "is secure against interference by the
executive or other appointing authority in a discretionary or arbitrary
fashion."13 In order for such security to be achieved, judges may be
"removable only for cause" as recommended by an independent
review process which affords judges a fair hearing! 4  Statutory
guarantees of security of tenure, according to Justice Le Dain, pass
the "reasonable person" test. Constitutional guarantees, while
perhaps desirable, are not essential! 5 Mr. Justice Le Dain held that
supernumerary judges in Ontario (that is, judges of retirement age
who are reappointed on a yearly basis) did not meet this minimal
guarantee at the time of Valente's trial, as their appointments could
be discontinued at the pleasure of the Attorney General, rather than
for cause. However, because Valente's judge was not super-
numerary, Valente was not affected by this lapse in minimum
standards. Moreover, the provincial legislature had since corrected
the situation by making the reappointment of supernumerary judges
contingent on the recommendation of the Chief Judge or the
provincial Judicial Council! 6  Analysed from the perspective of a
121bid. at 691.
1 3 1bid. at 698.
14lbid.
15Ibid. at 702.
1 6AIthough Mr. Justice Le Dain's reasoning regarding the supernumerary issue is
persuasive, one wonders why a supernumerary judge reappointed at pleasure is less
independent than a military tribunal. In MacKay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370, the
Supreme Court found that a military tribunal, even though it is closely associated with the
military establishment, and has no security of tenure, meets the requirements of judicial
independence pursuant to section 2(f) of tire Canadian Bill of Rights, which is the section in
182 [VOL. 26 NO. I
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strategy for consolidating judicial power, Mr. Justice Le Dain's
handling of the supernumerary question is ingenious!7 Through this
decision, the Supreme Court has successfully claimed the right to
determine the standards for the protection of judicial independence,
and at the same time no crisis of legitimacy has been created
concerning the propriety of courts determining and then policing the
extent of their own independence. This is because no statute was
actually struck down. 8 The Court merely applauded the provincial
government for amending a statute which it implied would have in
part been struck down, had it not been so amended.
Mr. Justice Le Dain held that in order for the second
condition of financial security to be met, the right to a salary, and
where appropriate to a pension, must be established by law 9  In
addition, the paymasters may not use their power over the purse
strings to interfere with judicial decision making, for example, by
reducing the salary of a judge who consistently decided against
claims of the government. Mr. Justice Le Dain did not consider
that the setting of judicial salaries by the legislature rather than by
the executive, as is the case for federally-appointed judges, to be an
essential condition for judicial independence. He noted that under
the Bill which corresponds to section 11(d) of the Charter. Nevertheless, MacKay is referred
to as an authority in Valente. The result of this discrepancy is that the threshold between the
need for legislative measures to protect judicial independence (as in the supernumerary issue),
and reliance on tradition (as in the case of military tribunals) remains unclear, in spite of Mr.
Justice Le Dain's firm stance that statutory guarantees of security of tenure are essential to
an independent tribunal.
17This is not to imply that Mr. Justice Le Dain had such a strategy in mind. However,
the Valente decision does happen to advance the legitimacy of judicial determination of the
scope of judicial independence. For a discussion of strategies which the judiciary, viewed as
an organization, may adopt in order to meet its "maintenance and enhancement needs," see
Carl Baar, "Patterns and Strategies of Court Administration in Canada and the United States"
(1977) 20 Can. Pub. Admin. 242.
18 0n the implications of the courts determining and then policing their own jurisdictions,
see P.H. Russell, "Constitutional Reform of the Judicial Branch: Symbolic vs. Operational
Considerations" (1984) 17 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 227 at 246.
9 Valente, supra, note 1 at 704.
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the Parliamentary system, the executive in fact controls the
legislature 20
The third essential condition for independence, the collective
independence of tribunals, is limited to matters directly affecting
adjudication, "assignment of judges, sittings of the court, and court
lists - as well as the related matters of allocation of court rooms
and direction of the administrative staff engaged in carrying out
these functions."21  The line which must be drawn between
administrative functions which directly affect adjudication, and other
administrative functions, is by necessity somewhat indistinct, but what
is significant is that Le Dain drew the line around a relatively
narrow range of administrative activities. He rejected Bates'
argument that judicial control over other aspects of court
administration was necessary to judicial independence. Mr. Justice
Le Dain claimed that the "reasonable person" test caught only those
administrative matters directly related to adjudication. 2  He noted
that former Quebec Superior Court Chief Justice Jules Deschenes,
the Committee on Judicial Independence of the Canadian Bar
Association, former Chief Justice Laskin, and Chief Justice Dickson
had all publicly supported much greater judicial control over court
administration activities not directly related to adjudication.2 3
2 01bid. at 706.
21 Ibid. at 709. These limits are similar to the ones identified by the Ontario Law
Reform Commission's Report on the Administration of Ontario Courts (Toronto: Ministry of
the Attorney General, 1973) at 7, 26-33, and 3840.
22Ibid. at 712.
231bid. at 708-12. In 1981, Chief Justice Deschenes with Carl Baar produced a report
entitled Masters h their own house: A Study on the Independent Judicial Administration of the
Courts (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1981). The study was sponsored by the Canadian
Judicial Council and the Canadian Judges Conference. It recommended that court
administration services become independent agencies under the control of judges through a
three stage process. The first two stages of this process were endorsed by the Canadian
Judicial Council and by the Canadian Bar Association's committee on judicial independence.
(See the committee's report, The Independence of the Iudiciay in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian
Bar Foundation, 1985.)) The second stage is decision sharing between the judiciary and tile
executive; the third stage is complete independence of the court administrative services. Both
the late Chief Justice Laskin in "Some Observations on Judicial Independence" (Address to
the Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges, 1980) and Chief Justice Dickson in 'The
Rule of Law: Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers" (Address to the Canadian
[voi- 26 NO. 1
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However, he concluded that such control, although it "may well be
highly desirable,"24 is not essential to the Charter requirement of
judicial independence.
The central importance of the Valente decision is that it
establishes at least three "essential conditions" for the existence of
judicial independence: security of tenure, financial security, and
institutional independence. All three must pass the "reasonable
person" test. However, security of tenure requires legislated
safeguards in order to pass. Financial security may be fulfilled
through less formal means, as long as the right to a salary is
established in law, and judicial decisions are not tampered with
through salary manipulation. Institutional independence extends only
such administrative matters as are directly related to adjudication.
II. THE BEAUREGARD CASE
The Beauregard case, which was decided by the Supreme
Court nine months after the Valente case, presented the court with
a second opportunity to continue the development of its doctrine of
judicial independence.
Marc Beauregard was appointed as a justice of the Quebec
Superior Court on 2 July 1975, during a time when the federal
Parliament was in the process of making major changes to the
salaries and pensions package for federally-appointed judges. These
changes were made in two stages. On 4 July 1975, the salaries of
provincial superior court judges were increased from $38,000 to
$53,000 per year. On 20 December 1975, the changes to the
judicial pensions, which provided for contributory pensions, became
law, retroactive to the date of the introduction of the legislation, 17
February 1975. Judges appointed before this date were
"grandfathered" regarding personal pension contributions, but were
required to pay 1.5% of their salaries to a survivor's pension fund.
Judges appointed on 17 February or afterwards would contribute,
Bar Association, Halifax, August 21, 1985) have supported an independent court
administration service similar to Deschenes' third stage.
2 41bid.
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within a short time, 7% of their salaries toward personal and
survivor's pensions. The level of pension benefits was substantially
increased both for new judges and "grandfathered" judges.25
Beauregard received his appointment after the increase in
salary took effect, but before the pension legislation was enacted.
However, because the pension legislation was made retroactive, its
provisions included Beauregard in the group of new judges who
would not receive the benefits of the "grandfather" clause.
Beauregard claimed never to have been told about the impending
pension legislation. He had accepted a judgeship expecting a salary
of $53,000 per year with no deduction for pension contributions,
only to discover later that the new pension legislation would cost
him almost $4,000 per year, or $125,000 over his judicial career.26
In the Federal Court, he challenged the validity of the pension
legislation on two grounds:
1. That it violated section 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867
("The Salaries, Allowances, and Pensions of the Judges of the
Superior, District and County Courts ... shall be fixed and provided
by the Parliament of Canada.")
2. That it violated section 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of
Rights - the section which recognizes "the right of the individual to
equality before the law and the protection of the law."
The argument based on the Bill of Rights did not succeed in
the Federal Court or in any of the subsequent appeals. However,
the section 100 argument succeeded, for somewhat different reasons,
in the Trial Division of the Federal Court, and the Federal Court of
Appeal, before going down to defeat in the Supreme Court of
Canada.
In dealing with the section 100 argument, Chief Justice
Dickson, whose opinion was accepted unanimously on this question,
noted that a major purpose of section 100 is to protect judicial
independence by making the federal Parliament, rather than the
executive, responsible for judicial salaries and pensions. Relying on
the Valente precedent, Chief Justice Dickson wrote that judicial
25Beauregard, supra, note 2 at 59.
261bid. at 95.
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independence requires that judicial salaries may not arbitrarily be
manipulated in order to influence judicial decisions. The stipulation
that the salaries of section 96 judges may only be changed through
the public Parliamentary process is intended to reduce the chances
of judicial independence being abrogated through salary
manipulation. 27
The section 100 argument presented the Supreme Court with
an opportunity to comment further on the nature and requirements
of judicial independence. In the Valente case, Mr. Justice Le Dain
had focussed on the conditions for judicial independence. In
Beauregard, Chief Justice Dickson's analysis shifted to another aspect
of judicial independence - its purpose 2 8
According to Chief Justice Dickson, judicial independence
has two purposes. The first is to allow individual judges complete
liberty to hear and decide the cases that come before them. "[N]o
outsider - be it government, pressure group, individual or even
another judge - should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere,
with the way in which a judge conducts his or her case and makes
his or her decision." Chief Justice Dickson refers to this as the
"core" purpose of judicial independence.29 This was the purpose
which was implied by Mr. Justice Le Dain throughout his opinion in
Valente.30
The second purpose of judicial independence is to enable the
courts to fulfill their institutional role in Canada, that is, as an
independent branch of government whose duty it is to protect the
constitution.
2 71bid. at 72 and 75-78.
2 8The development of a "purposive" approach to Charter of Rights issues has been a
hallmark of the post-1982 Supreme Court, especially of the Chief Justice's decisions. See
especially Hwter v. Southan Inc, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 and R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985]
1 S.C.R. 295. It is noteworthy that this purposive approach is now being applied to the
Constitution Act 1867.
29Beauregard, supra, note 2 at 69-70.
3 0Mr. Justice Le Dain referred throughout his decision to the necessity for judges to have
the capacity to act independently from others. See especially Valente, supra, note I at 686 ff.
Le Dain did not mention the institutional role of the courts in the sense in which Mr. Chief
Justice Dickson used this concept in Beauregard, supra, note 2.
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The rationale for this two-pronged modem understanding of judicial independence
is recognition that the courts are ... [the] protector of the Constitution and the
fundamental values embodied in it - rule of law, fundamental justice, equality,
preservation of the democratic process, to name perhaps the most important.31
Because courts in Canada have this institutional role to play,
judicial independence, according to Chief Justice Dickson, is even
more important in Canada than it is in the United Kingdom. Chief
Justice Dickson posited that in order for Canadian judges to
perform the institutional role, the judiciary must be "completely
separate in authority and function from all other participants in the
justice system."32
Having identified the dual purposes of judicial independence
in Canada, Chief Justice Dickson considered the merit of
Beauregard's section 100 argument. This argument related to the
second essential condition for judicial independence established in
the Valente case - financial security. Chief Justice Dickson reasoned
that Parliament's 1975 pension legislation did not represent arbitrary
interference with the financial security of the judiciary in order to
influence judicial decision making. Therefore, this legislation could
not reasonably be considered an interference with judicial
independence.33
In addition to arguments related to judicial independence,
Beauregard's counsel had put forth a "strict construction" argument,
to the effect that the word "provide" in section 100 means that
Parliament must provide 100% of the cost of pensions, and that the
word "pensions" in section 100 means what it did in 1867 - non-
contributory pensions. Chief Justice Dickson invoked the doctrine
of progressive interpretation 34 to refute this argument:
31lbid. at 70. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Dickson fails to mention legislative
supremacy in this list of important constitutional values in the United Kingdom. It would be
difficult to reconcile legislative supremacy with the position that the courts ought to be
separate in authority from the other branches of government.
3 2 1bid. at 73 (emphasis in original text).
3 3 Ibid. at 77-78.
3 4 SeeP. Hogg, CotstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 340.
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"The Canadian Constitution is not locked forever in a 119-year old
casket. It lives and breathes and is capable of growing to keep pace
with the growth of the country and its people.'35
The strategic effect of the Beauregard decision was similar to
that of Valente, in that governmental action was defended, and no
statute was struck down. At the same time, the official Supreme
Court doctrine of judicial independence was considerably broadened.
Mr. Justice Le Dain had defined the institutional independence of
the judiciary to include only matters directly related to adjudication,
such as assignment of judges to cases. He had associated the need
for this institutional independence to the adjudicative function itself,
not to what Chief Justice Dickson referred to as the institutional
role of the courts 36 Chief Justice Dickson moved far beyond the
narrow concept of institutional independence in Valente. For the
Chief Justice, the judiciary has a role to play as protector of the
constitution, and as such, it must be "completely separate in
authority and function 7 from the other two branches of
government in both the federal and provincial domains.
It is this broadening of the concept of the collective
independence of the judiciary in obiter which may prove to be the
most significant aspect of the Beauregard decision in future litigation.
Although the Beauregard case does not deal with a Charter issue,
the discussion of the nature of judicial independence in Beauregard
would certainly be relevant to the deciding of future cases involving
the interpretation of section 11(d) of the Charter In particular, the
obiter in Beauregard might be applicable to cases which, unlike
Valente, concerned actual rather than hypothetical examples of the
effect on judicial independence of court administration services
provided by the executive.
35Beauregard, supra, note 2 at 81.
3 6Valente, supra, note 1 at 678.
37Bcauregard, supra, note 2 at 73.
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DOCTRINE
OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
There are three important issues relating to the nature of
judicial independence which the Supreme Court did not fully address
in Valente and Beauregard. The first issue is the relation between
judicial independence and judicial impartiality. The second is the
relation between judicial independence and the various mechanisms
or procedures developed by a political system to protect judicial
independence. The third is the institutional role of the courts.
A. The Relation between Independence and Impartiality
Although Mr. Justice Le Dain distinguished between
independence and impartiality in Valente, he did not clearly analyse
the relation between these two concepts. It is useful, as Mr. Justice
Le Dain has done, to identify impartiality as a state of mind, and
independence "not merely as a state of mind ... but as a status or
relationship to others, particularly to the executive branch of
government.....38 According to this approach, the "primary meaning"
to be given to judicial independence is an "objective status or
relationship."3 9 Nevertheless, he claimed that independence is "a
state of mind" (that is, impartiality) "as well as" a status or
relationship.4° Mr. Justice Le Dain seemed to be suggesting that
judicial independence includes judicial impartiality, but that
independence primarily concerns relationships between judges and
others, rather than impartiality. He does not indicate what purpose
is served by on the one hand thinking of impartiality as a distinct
concept, but on the other hand thinking of it as an element of
judicial independence.
38 Valente, supra, note 1 at 685.
3 91bid. at 688.
4 0Ibid. at 689.
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Theodore Becker, one of the few academics to have
systematically analysed the nature of the judicial process, has pointed
out that independence and impartiality have often been confused
with each other by academic writers as well as by judges. He
demonstrates the usefulness, from both a theoretical and a research
perspective, of considering them as separate but related concepts.
Like Mr. Justice Le Dain, Becker identified impartiality with a state
of mind and independence with relationships between judges and
others, but he was more precise. To Becker, impartiality meant an
objective state of mind which is fostered by reliance on law to
resolve disputes, whereas independence referred to the ability to
decide in opposition to others with political power.41 The utility of
Becker's approach is twofold. First, it facilitates the theoretical
exploration of the role of both independence and impartiality in the
judicial process. Second, it accommodates the measurement of the
degree to which any particular judge possesses independence or
impartiality. Becker's primary interest was in measurement; as a
result, his discussion of the relation between independence and
impartiality was limited. He did posit, however, that impartiality is
"the heart of the judicial process. "42 This would seem to be a useful
starting point for considering the relation between impartiality and
independence. If it is true, as Becker claims, that the state of mind
of impartiality is the sine qua non43 of adjudication, then judicial
independence can usefully be considered as one condition for
judicial impartiality.44 It is central to the adjudicative process that
judges decide disputes, as much as possible, without any pre-
conceived notions of favouritism or animosity toward any of the
litigants, that is with impartiality. One method of promoting
impartiality is to attempt to ensure that the judge is free from
outside interference by the litigants or other interested parties,
41 T. Becker, Comparative JudicialPolitics (New York: Rand & McNally, 1970) at 13 and
144.
421bid. at 26.
431bid.
4 4This approach is adopted by F.L. Morton in Law, Politics, and the Judicial Process il
Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1984) at 97.
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interference which is intended to bias the judge. In other words,
the purpose of judicial independence, which is the freedom from
relationships which could reasonably induce bias, is to promote
judicial impartiality.
If judicial independence is considered as a support for
judicial impartiality, then an analysis of judicial independence cannot
avoid a consideration of the nature of judicial impartiality.
Complete judicial impartiality, it must be admitted, can never be
achieved. In some senses, it ought not be achieved. For example,
a Canadian judge should not to be expected to remain neutral with
regard to the basic tenets of the nation's liberal-democratic political
system, which after all is the justification for judicial impartiality in
the first place.45 Perhaps this is one factor which Chief Justice
Dickson was alluding to in the Beauregard case when he stated that
the institutional role of judges calls- upon them to protect "the
fundamental values embodied "46 in the constitution. Outside of
adherence to these basic norms, however, judges are expected to
banish any preconceived notions as to which litigant ought to win a
case, so that the judge's decision is based, as much as practically
possible, on an objective consideration of the law and of the facts.
The state of mind which allows this objective consideration is not an
absolute one, one which is either present or not present. Rather,
it is a state of mind which judges may come close to, or may be
distant from. If it were possible to measure the kinds of biases
which affect judicial decision making, then individual judges might be
placed on a continuum between the humanly impossible goal of
complete impartiality and its opposite, total partiality toward one or
the other of the litigants in a case. The principle of the rule of law
admonishes Canadian judges to strive to place themselves as close
as possible to the impartial end of the continuum. The fact that
workshops and conferences occasionally take place which are
designed to help judges become aware of possible unconscious
biases, for example toward women or minority groups, and thereby
overcome to some extent the effects of these biases, suggests that
45See, supra, note 4.
46Beauregard, supra, note 2 at 70.
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with effort, judges can perhaps come closer to achieving the state of
mind of impartiality4 7 Judicial independence, considered as the
absence of relationships which are most likely to lead to attitudes of
partiality, is only one of the methods developed in our political
system to promote judicial impartiality. The rule of natural justice,
nemno judex in sua causa, is another 8 The expectation that judges
should refrain from joining groups likely to litigate is another.4 9 Yet
another is the rule that judges may not make speeches about
"political" matters5 ° Furthermore, attempts to make the law as
explicit as possible could be regarded as promoting judicial
impartiality, because such laws reduce the effect of judicial
discretion, and thus the possibility for biasY
A complete analysis of judicial impartiality is beyond the
scope of this paper. The point which is being emphasized through
this cursory discussion of the relation between impartiality and.
independence is that unless the connection between these two
concepts is clearly understood, difficulties are likely to arise in
determining whether violations of judicial independence have
occurred. For example, the Canadian Judicial Council's Investigation
Committee regarding Mr. Justice Thomas Berger concluded that
Berger had violated judicial independence because he had
4 7For the proceedings of one such conference, see Sheilah L. Martin & Kathleen F.
Mahoney, Equalio
, 
and Judicial Neutralig' (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
48 For a discussion of this principle see D. P. Jones & Anne S. De Villers, Principles of
Administrative Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 244 ff.
49See J.O. Wilson, A Book for Judges (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada,
1980).
50See "Report of the Investigation Committee of the Canadian Judicial Council in the
matter of the Honourable Mr. Justice Berger," mimeo. (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council,
1982).
5 1Becker, supra, note 41, identified impartiality almost entirely with the existence of clear,
explicit laws. Becker may have defined impartiality too narrowly through his attempt to create
an operational definition of the concept which would allow for empirical testing of its
presence.
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abandoned the appearance of impartiality5 2 This conclusion is
confusing. The Investigation Committee presented a persuasive
argument that Berger had violated the appearance of impartiality.
It then jumped to the arguably illogical conclusion that therefore,
judicial independence had been violated. As the discussion above
has shown, a lack of independence could be considered a good
indicator of a lack of impartiality. However, a lack of impartiality
taken alone does not necessarily mean a lack of independence. The
absence of impartiality could be caused by a number of factors, of
which lack of independence is only one. The Investigation
Committee's report was not universally well received. 53 One reason
for the public criticism of the Report may have been that the
Investigation Committee neglected to discuss the relation between
independence and impartiality. Absent such an analysis, the
committee's conclusion may have seemed unconvincing.
The critical test for judicial independence utilized in Valente
and Beauregard is the "reasonable person" test. The difficulty with
this test is that it could prove to be too subjective to serve as a
litmus test for judicial independence. A more careful consideration
of the nature of impartiality and its connection with independence
may help to provide a clearer guide as to whether judicial
independence has been violated than the "reasonable person" test.
B. The Relation between Tudicial Independence and its Support
Mechanisms
Three of the methods developed in the Anglo-Canadian
tradition to protect judicial independence are tenure until retirement
during good behaviour, financial security, and the collective
independence of the judiciary regarding matters directly affecting
52"Report of the Investigation Committee of the Canadian Judicial Council in tile matter
of the Honourable Mr. Justice Berger," supra, note 50 at 20 ff.
53 For example, Alan Borovoy of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and Jacques
Flynn, Opposition Leader in the Senate, were critical of the Report. See Gerald Gall, The
Canadian Legal System, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 190-191.
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adjudication. Mr. Justice Le Dain refers to these as three "essential
conditions"54 for judicial independence. It is perhaps more useful to
think of these three factors as mechanisms developed by our
political system to protect judicial independence, than as essential
conditions. To illustrate this point, it is instructive to remember
that other political systems which claim to have judicial
independence have developed somewhat different protective
mechanisms. For example, many state court judges in the United
States do not have the security of tenure described by Mr. Justice
Le Dain as an essential condition of judicial independence. They
may be removed other than for cause and without an independent
inquiry. The electorate can remove them for any reason.5 Most
American jurists and political scientists, nevertheless, would contend
that such judges are independent5 6 To take a further example,
many judges in Canada think that judicial independence implies that
even senior judges may not attempt to influence the decision-making
process of more junior judges.5 7  Chief Justice Dickson in
Beauregard alluded to this notion by noting that "even another judge
[may not] interfere with the way in which a judge conducts his or
her case and makes his or her decision."58 However, if this view is
correct, then French judges are not independent, because junior
judges are supervised by senior judges, and are promoted according
54 Valente, supra, note 1 at 691, 694, 704, and 708.
5 5The most recent example of the removal of a judge by the electorate was the electoral
defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court and two associate justices
late in 1986. For an analysis of issues in this retention election, see Robert S. Thompson,
"Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial Elections, and the California Supreme
Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate" (1986) 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 809 at 828.
5 6For example, see Becker, supra, note 41 at 148. Becker assigns a higher rating to
lifetime tenure, as compared to more limited forms of tenure, as one of several indicators of
judicial independence. Lack of lifelime tenure does not imply lack of independence to Becker,
but rather a less effective means of ensuring independence.
5 7Interviews by the author with a random sample of 40 Ontario judges at all levels of
court, 1979 and 1980. Sixty percent of the judges said that senior judges should not have any
influence on the decision-making process of junior judges, including decisions regarding the
scheduling of cases.
58Beauregard, supra, note 2 at 69.
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to their decision-making abilities as assessed by senior judges. There
is no doubt that this promotional system influences how junior
judges decide cases. Yet the French consider that their judges are
independent 9  From their perspective, the supervisory responsi-
bilities of senior judges are not a violation of independence, because
senior judges are not outsiders who are attempting to destroy a
junior judge's impartiality. Rather, their function through the
supervisory process is to promote higher levels of impartiality among
the junior judges. Moreover, because promotions of judges in
France are made from within the judicial system rather than by
politicians outside the judiciary, there is no possibility that politicians
could use promotional powers to entice judges to comply with the
politicians' wishes. In contrast, executive control of judicial
appointments in Canada could be used as a lever to manipulate
judicial decision making, as Noel Bates pointed out at the Valente
trialI.60 '
What these examples illustrate is that human history has
produced a wide range of mechanisms for promoting and protecting
judicial independence in countries which claim to adhere to this
norm. None of these mechanisms is complete or perfect in itself 61
What all of the mechanisms are designed to do is to reduce the
number of relationships between judges and others which hinder or
appear to hinder their impartiality. If Canada continues to mature
as a liberal democracy, presumably both her constitutional theorists
and her practical politicians will continue to search for more
appropriate and effective mechanisms to protect the independence
of judges, as well as of others who exercise adjudicative
responsibilities. In order to avoid locking the mechanisms for
protecting judicial independence in that 19-year old casket abhorred
by Chief Justice Dickson, it would be prudent not to confuse judicial
59See HJ. Abraham, The Judicial Process, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986) at c. II and VI.
6 0See the Valente trial court decision, supra, note 7. To the best of the author's
knowledge, there are no documented examples of such occurrences in Canada.
61Lederman describes a number of the procedures which have developed in the Anglo-
Canadian tradition for protecting judicial independence. See Lederman, supra, note 3.
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independence - an enduring goal - with the transitory mechanisms
thus far developed to protect and promote it.
The question of the continued relevance of the prohibition
of the public criticism of the judiciary and judicial decisions, as a
mechanism to protect judicial independence, will help to illustrate
this point. According to Lederman, entering into relationships with
judges by publicly criticizing their decisions could be regarded as
attempting to impair their impartiality. Such criticism might be
perceived by judges as coercion either to decide future cases in the
direction suggested by the criticism, or else suffer a new round of
similar criticism.62  In Canada, the prohibition of criticism of the
judiciary and its decisions as a mechanism for protecting judicial
independence has been enforced through contempt of court
proceedings much more rigorously than in the United States courts,
where freedom of expression has been given comparatively greater
weight.63  The question of the continued relevance of the
prohibition of criticism of the judiciary and its decisions is certainly
an important one, especially in the wake of the Kopyto affair. 61 If
the prohibition against criticism of judicial decisions were ever
declared another "essential condition" for judicial independence, then
further debate about this important issue would be largely academic.
In Valente, Mr. Justice Le Dain did note that the "essential
conditions" for judicial independence evolve over time so as to adapt
to changing social and political needs.65 This recognition in itself
tacitly supports the position of this essay that the phrase, "essential
conditions," too rigidly describes the devices which have been
invented to protect and promote judicial independence.
62See Lederman in the Can. B. Rev., supra, note 3 at 799 and 804.
63See C. Beckton, "Freedom of Expression (s. 2(b))," in W.S. Tarnopolsky & Gerald A.
Beaudoin, eds, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carsvell, 1982) at
75 and 91.
64Harry Kopyto was convicted of a form of contempt of court in late October 1986
because of making accusations that the courts were biased in favour of the police. His
conviction was overturned on appeal [unreported case]. See L. Shifrin, "A Court Decision
from the Middle Ages" The Toronto Star (3 November 1986) A15.
65Valente, supra, note 1 at 691-92.
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C. The "Institutional" Role of the Courts
In Beauregard, Chief Justice Dickson claimed that there are
two purposes for judicial independence in Canada - to ensure that
individual judges may decide cases without outside pressure, and to
allow judges to fulfill their institutional role of protecting the
constitution. He reasoned that because of the second purpose,
safeguards must be put in place to protect judicial independence
which are in addition to the safeguards put in place as a result of
the first purpose.
This argument, which I will refer to as the "institutional"
argument, posits that the courts have an institutional role to play as
arbiters between the federal and provincial governments, as
defenders of civil liberties against government encroachment, and
generally, as protectors of the constitution. Therefore, the courts
must be completely separate from the other two branches of
government in order to be truly independent and impartial in their
institutional role.
Apparently, this degree of separateness from the other two
branches would not be necessary if the second purpose of judicial
independence did not exist, as is the case, for example, in the
United Kingdom. 66 In Canada, however, complete separation of the
judiciary is needed because constitutional challenges always involve
claims' against the executive or legislative branches. The courts
cannot act effectively as independent and impartial arbiters if they
function under the authority of any of the litigating parties.
There are two problems with the institutional argument.
First, it overlooks the fact that even if the courts in Canada did not
have to decide constitutional cases, the most frequent litigants in the
courts would still be governments. The Crown is the prosecutor in
almost all criminal cases. If adequate safeguards are in place to
prevent the violation of judicial independence by the Crown in
criminal cases, it is difficult to understand why these safeguards
6 6Chief Justice Dickson thought the institutional role of the courts in Canada made
judicial independence more important in Canada than in the U.K. See Beauregard, supra, nole
2 at 71.
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would not also be adequate in constitutional cases. In fact, criminal
cases greatly outnumber constitutional cases in Canadian courts.
From this perspective, it is even more important to demonstrate to
Canadians that judges can and do decide independently from the
Crown in criminal cases than in constitutional cases.
It could be countered, however, that the cabinet, as the
central body of the executive branch of government, is rarely
interested in the outcome of individual criminal cases, whereas the
outcome of most constitutional cases is of critical concern.
Therefore, the cabinet would be more likely to try to interfere with
judicial decision making in constitutional than in criminal cases.
Nevertheless, it could just as easily be argued that cabinets are less
likely to attempt to interfere with judicial decision making in
constitutional cases precisely because these cases tend to command
such a high profile. Violations of judicial independence would be
more likely to come to the public's attention in constitutional cases
than in criminal cases. Criminal cases are not as often litigated in
the media spotlight as constitutional cases.
The second difficulty with the institutional argument is that
it does not recognize that the courts are necessarily part of
government.67 They constitute one of the three branches of
government - the one responsible for the adjudication of disputes
arising out of law - and in this sense they cannot be completely
separate from the other two branches. What is important is that
judges, in spite of being part of government, ought to be in the
most advantageous position to be impartial as circumstances will
permit - not that judges be "completely separate" from the other
two branches. Independence, that is, the avoidance of relationships
with those in the other two branches of government which may
compromise a judge's impartiality, is one of the methods by which
6ZfGovernment" is used here to mean the official institutions for governing a country,
rather than the executive or the administration. The fact that the word "government" can be
used in either of these senses is sometimes confusing. For example, the word "government"
in the Canadian constitution contains examples of the use of both senses, and it is not always
clear which sense is intended. In .. D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the courts are "one of the three fundamental branches of
government" (at 600). The Court also concluded that the references to "government" in
section 32 of the Charter do not apply to the courts, because "government" there refers to the
executive branch (at 598).
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impartiality is promoted. However, because the courts are part of
government, a complete absence of such relationships is impossible.
What is required is the avoidance of those relationships which are
the most likely to impair a judge's impartiality.
As Le Dain noted in Valente, judges must have control over
matters directly affecting adjudication, such as the assignment of
judges to cases, and the supervision of staff inside the courtroom.
These are matters which, if controlled by the executive branch of
government, could very easily be used to affect the outcome of the
adjudicative process.68 However, he specifically stated that judicial
independence did not require that judges must control administrative
matters other than those directly affecting adjudication. 69 Chief
Justice Dickson did not repeat this narrow version of judicial
institutional independence in Beauregard, and his discussion of the
institutional purpose of judicial independence seems to leave open
the possibility that institutional independence might necessarily
include control over a broader range of court administration
activities.
Chief Justice Dickson's address to the Canadian Bar
Association in 1985 leaves no doubt that at least as a private
individual, the Chief Justice believes that judges should control a
broader range of administrative activities in order to protect judicial
independence.70 In this speech, the Chief Justice maintained that
Canada's federal system, along with the constitutional position of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, requires the existence of a judiciary
"separate in authority and function from all political organs."7' In
order to be truly separate, he argued, the judiciary must be
administratively independent from the other two branches of
government. This is a theme which the late Chief Justice Laskin
68Not so many years ago, the Crown Attorney's office in a Toronto courthouse controlled
the assignment of judges to cases. This power was occasionally used to assign "tough" judges
to cases in which the Crown particularly wanted a conviction, according to interviews by the
author with Crown prosecutors and court administrators in Toronto in 1979 and 1980.
69 Valente, supra, note 1 at 709 ff.
70Dickson, supra, note 23.
711bid at 3.
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had also pursued, and Chief Justice Dickson quoted from the late
Chief Justice Laskin in identifying the minimum requirements of
judicial administrative independence:
independence in budgeting and in expenditure of an approved budget, and
independence in administration covering not only the operation of the courts, but
also the appointment and supervision of the supporting staff.72
The argument that judges need to control administrative
matters not directly related to adjudication in order to protect
judicial independence is debatable. In this short essay, it is not
possible to present both sides of the issue in any detail.73 However,
several examples will at least illustrate that the problem is a complex
one with no obviously correct solution. 74  Under the current
Canadian system, in which judges do not normally play roles in
administrative matters not directly related to adjudication, it would
be possible, for instance, for the executive to slash the budgets of
the courts in which the judges decided consistently against the
Crown.75 It would also be possible for the executive to order court
office staff to harass a non-compliant judge. Judicial control over
budgeting and personnel administration might prevent such
episodes.76
However, under a system of judicial control of such matters,
a new set of relationships would arise which could tempt violations
72Address, at 12, quoting from the late Chief Justice Bora Laskin, "Some Observations
on Judicial Independence' supra, note 23 at 4-5.
73See P.S. Millar & Carl Baar, Judicial Administration in Canada (Montreal: McGill-
Queens, 1981), the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on the Administration of Ontario
Courts, supra, note 21, and Deschenes, supra, note 23, for more detailed discussions of this
issue.
741n the survey referred to in note 57, only 47% of the judges thought that the principle
of judicial independence required judicial control over such activities.
751n April 1986, the Quebec government made serious cutbacks in court staffing. The
judiciary was able to obtain an injunction to prevent any firings until such time as the question
of whether the firings violated judicial independence could be heard. The outcome of this
case may turn on whether the staff were fired for purely economic reasons or in order to
manipulate judicial decision making. See Le Devoir [d Montreal] (19 avril 1986).
76See Deschenes, supra, note 23. Deschnes recommended complete judicial control over
court administration in order to prevent these kinds of violations of judicial indepencence.
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of judicial independence. For example, judges may be called upon
to defend their proposed court budget before a legislative
committee.77 It would be natural for judges to lobby the key players
in the budget process in support of the court's proposed budget.
Such relationships could present opportunities for the violation of
judicial independence with regard to any court cases in which the
key players in the budget process had an interest. Furthermore,
presumably judges would be liable for the normal administrative
sanctions for any overexpenditures of the budget. It is not clear
that this new set of relationships among judges, legislators, and
administrators would further isolate the judges from situations which
might lead to violations of judicial independence.
Former Chief Justice Laskin proposed that in order to
insulate a judge-controlled court administration from politics, the
Attorney General could act as a "conduit" between the judiciary
(which would draw up the court's budget) and the legislature.78
Such a procedure, however, could create yet another relationship
which might foster the violation of judicial independence. It would
be possible for the Minister to refuse to act as an effective,
energetic "conduit" unless the judiciary agreed to make decisions
more in accord with the Cabinet's wishes.
Judicial administrative control is not the only possible
solution to the problem of protecting the judicial branch from being
manipulated by executive control over court administration. Any
cabinet minister or public servant who attempted to influence a
judge with administrative weapons could be cited for contempt of
court for attempting to violate judicial independence. Alternativcly,
the judge could make public the apparent interference with judicial
independence, and call upon the executive to order a public enquiry
into the matter. This kind of situation in fact occurred in British
Columbia in 1979. The Deputy Attorney General telephoned a
Provincial Court Judge to inquire as to whether the judge would be
willing to transfer himself to another court so that the issue of the
7 7Deschenes suggested that if the judges are given the responsibility for the preparation
of the budgets of the courts, senior judges could, if they wished, appear before a legislative
committee to defend the proposed budget. See ibid. at 167.
78 Late Chief Justice Laskin, sirra, note 23 at 5.
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constitutionality of the province's new Family Relations Act could be
avoided. The judge in question was committed to having this issue
argued, whereas other judges were apparently available who would
ignore the constitutional question. The judge made public the
telephone conversation, and the resulting furor led to a judicial
inquiry into the incident. The inquiry confirmed a violation of
judicial independence. 79
If some judges become involved in personnel administration,
another new set of relationships would arise which may lead to a
weakening of the safeguards for judicial independence. For one
thing, administrative judges could well become directly involved, as
management, in confrontations with labour, and perhaps even with
labour unions.80 Such situations could, in fact or in appearance,
impair the impartiality of judges in cases involving labour.
Moreover, good personnel administration requires a constant
awareness of potential personnel problems, and the devotion of time
and energy to their solution. It is reasonable to suppose that a
preoccupation with personnel problems would distract a judge from
cultivating an impartial frame of mind. One of the advantages of
not involving judges in personnel administration is that without such
responsibilities, judges are free to concentrate on adjudication,
unpressured by administrative worries. As a former Ontario
Attorney General once claimed, judicial independence means that
judges should be 'Tree" from the "stress" of administrative duties.81
7 9 Mr. Justice P.D. Seaton, Report of Conmnission of Inquity Pursuant to Order-in Council
#1885, 5 July 1979. Disciplinary action was not recommended bccause no "evil intent" was
involved. The implication was that if any subsequent violations of a similar nature were to
occur, they should be dealt with more harshly.
8ODeschenes supra, note 23 at 166 recommended that in order to prevent confrontations
between the judiciary and labour unions, court employees should remain part of the civil
service for the purpose of collective bargaining. No doubt, such an arrangement would serve
a useful purpose. However, even this arrangement might not prevent a judge from developing
feelings of animosity toward labour unions if a union's policy was perceived by a judge to
affect detrimentally the performance of court employees.
8 !Statement of the Honourable Dalton Bales, Q.C., Attorney General, on the occasion
of the tabling of parts one and two of the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on the
Administration of Ontario Courts (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, mimeo., 1973)
at 9.
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If the judiciary were to be assigned the kinds of
administrative responsibilities advocated by Dickson and others, then
careful consideration should be given to procedures for making
judges accountable for their administrative decisions. For example,
one of the major justifications for judicial retention elections in
California is that they are said to make judges answerable for their
administrative decisions. (In theory, it is not proper to make a
judicial case decision an election issue unless there has been a
violation of impartiality or independence. However, administrative
decisions are fair game for debate during election campaigns, as it
is thought that most administrative decisions have little to do with
adjudicative responsibilities.) The accountability issue and its
implications have not usually been addressed by those Canadian
judges who advocate a greater judicial role in administration.8 2
The question of what administrative mechanisms would best
serve judicial independence - judicial control of all matters related
to court administration, or judicial control only of matters directly
related to adjudication - is a complex issue with no single correct
solution. It would be unwise for the Canadian Supreme Court to
attempt to deduce a solution from its current doctrine of judicial
independence. The Court's consideration of judicial independence,
as it has developed so far, has not even mentioned the practical
consequences of judicial control over court administration8 3 It
would be imprudent to overlook the effects on judicial independence
of the new relationships which judicial control over all aspects of
court administration would give rise to.
82 For a commentary on judicial retention elections and accountability, see Thompson,
supra, note 55.
The accountability issue underlines, from another perspective, the danger of labelling tile
mechanisms developed to promote judicial independence as "essential conditions:' If Canadian
judges are given broader administrative responsibilities, it would seem sensible at least to
consider the potential value of judicial retention elections as an accountability device.
However, now that the criteria for removability of judges have been established as part of an
"essential condition,' the possibility of judicial retention elections to encourage administrative
accountability seems to have been ruled out in advance.
83The report of the Canadian Bar Association's committee on judicial independence
supra, note 23 also neglected to consider the practical consequences of the nev kinds of
relations which judicial control over more aspects of judicial administration would engender.
The committee recommended increased judicial control over aspects of court administration
not directly related to adjudication as a safeguard for judicial independence.
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V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
The doctrine of judicial independence thus far developed by
the Supreme Court of Canada, although sound in some respects,
contains deficiencies. In Valente, the court prudently rejected the
notion that judicial independence for all judges is coterminous with
some of the specific constitutional devices which have been invented
to help protect judicial independence. However, the analysis in
Valente is incomplete with respect to the relation between
independence and impartiality. Moreover, the characterization of
several of the general methods developed to protect judicial
independence as "essential conditions" is somewhat too rigid. In
Beauregard, the Supreme Court wisely rejected a strict construction
reading of section 100 of the Constitution Ac4 1867 - an
interpretation which would have frozen the devices to protect
judicial independence in their 1867 incarnation. However, the
apparent attempt in obiter to broaden the scope of judicial
institutional independence is questionable.
It may be useful for an analysis of the requirements of
judicial independence in Canada to take into account (1) the
relation between independence and impartiality, and (2) the relation
between judicial independence and the mechanisms developed to
protect it. Judicial independence may usefully be considered as one
very critical safeguard for judicial impartiality. The mechanisms
devised to protect judicial independence are best regarded not as
"essential conditions" in a timeless sense, but rather as devices
developed, sometimes in a trial and error fashion, to respond to the
particular needs of a specific era. To enshrine these methods in the
constitution through judicial interpretation would limit the
constitutional flexibility which is required to allow the judiciary, the
legislature, and the executive to act in the most appropriate fashion
to protect judicial independence in the wake of changing social and
political conditions.
Over the past few years, there have been calls from a
number of sources to implant the principle of judicial independence
more firmly in the constitution than it now is through section 11(d)
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of the Charter.8 4 (The reference to judicial independence in section
11(d) only covers cases in which persons are charged with offences.)
It is questionable whether such an amendment would serve any
useful purpose, as the courts have demonstrated that they are quite
capable of protecting judicial independence through contempt of
court citations without the necessity of additional supports.85 On
the other hand, a firmer guarantee of judicial independence in the
constitution, if interpreted unwisely by the courts, could do
considerable harm to the reputation of the courts as constitutional
philosophers. Canadians might be advised to be cautious about
giving the courts too many openings to expand their own empires
through a case law definition of a new constitutional reference to
judicial independence. Because judicial independence is such an
integral part of the liberal democratic tradition, it would be fitting
if the concept continued to evolve more through the democratic
process than through judicial fiat.
8 4See the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Constitution, Towards a New
Canada (Ottawa: Can. Bar Association, 1978); D.P. Jones, "A Constitutionally Guaranteed
Role for the Courts" (1979) 57 Can. B. Rev. 669; and the Canadian Bar Association
Committee on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra, note 23.
85For example, consider the 'judges affair," which resulted in the conviction of a cabinet
minister for contempt of court. See J. Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review of Politics and
Public Affairs, 1976 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) at 13-18.
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